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Abstract: 
 
The focus of this paper is the mechanism of ideology dissemination. It explains how ideology 
emerges from ideas and through shared beliefs develops to be expressed in recurring 
actions. Ideologies and institutions constitute an II-system, where ideas and rules interact 
mutually as form and substance.  
 
The paper tackles the question whether shared beliefs can be disseminated through the 
institutional export, whether it is needed to export ideologies hot on the heels of institutions. 
Through logical modeling, game theory application and Sustainability/CSR example we 
illustrate the inverse mechanism of beliefs dissemination and substantiate the worth wiliness 
of institutions ideologization.  
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Introduction  
 
In as much as the paper concerns ideologies, it is expedient to begin with the 
proposition that a human being tends to perceive reality by means of belief. A 
human being is Homo credens not in a smaller extent than Homo sapiens. Belief-as-
trust, belief-as-opinion, belief-as-aspiration, belief-as-ideology at last (Platonova, 
2010) are the foundation of decision making. “Without believing one cannot make a 
step from being stuck in the state of doubts” (Peirce, 1877).  
 
Belief-systems are affected by the ideas and can be redefined when the ideas are 
assimilated. Ideas initiate searching the arguments to overcome intervened doubts 
leading to the mind uneasiness and anxiety. To avoid such uneasiness fixation of 
belief is used.  The latter influences behavior positively, on the one hand, by making 
environment predictable and decision-making easier. That’s why shared beliefs seem 
to be seeking for stability in shared practices, which are informal and formal 
institutions. On the other hand, such fixation by insensible degrees leads to path-
dependency that is considered to be negative, as path-dependency prevents from 
pending changes of behavioral patterns, holds mind in illusion. Institutional 
transplantation is one of the ways to make the members of recipient social group 
redefine their beliefs, as during “de-institutionalization and re-institutionalization” 
beliefs’ taken-for-grantedness become compromised (Higss, 2009).  
 
Thus, institutionalization of shared beliefs is the objective development of ideology 
from chaotic idea to stable rules, since it starts from sudden individual mental 
models conformity, supported with resources and then materialized in practices and 
physical objects (Athanasenas et al., 2015; Nechaev and Antipina 2016; Theriou, 
2014 and Theriou et al., 2014). Beliefs dissemination caused by institutional 
transplantation seems to be subjective as it starts with spreading rules and continues 
with looking for mental models conformity to decrease the risk of opportunistic 
behavior and costs for monitoring of compliance with the rules (Duguleana and 
Duguleana 2016).  The dimension of the research is micro level, so an individual 
accepting or rejecting ideas, believing and acting in accordance with his/her beliefs 
is an Object of research. Methods to be applied are institutional analysis (including 
game theory), method of logical modelling.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. First, we get acquainted with the types of 
ideology. Then we come closer to the issue of so called “fixation of belief” (Pierce, 
1877) and show why shared beliefs turn into shared practices and how and why they 
are kept from changes that explains institutional rigidity. Later on existing theories 
of ideology formation are illustrated; systemic approach is applied to describe the 
mechanism of how ideas turn into institutions. Institutional analysis and game theory 
allow us to show how ideology changes a believer’s attitude to payoff and utility, in 
such a way constructs and reconstructs institutions. We come to the conclusion, that 
ideology is needed to make institutions work and prevent opportunistic behavior, 
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since shared beliefs provide players with the options of possible set of strategies, 
help to predict decisions of others and easier find the equilibrium state of a game.  
Having considered the direct way of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization 
three scenarios of institutional change were defined resulting from the 
transformation of ideology: mediation, inversion and lock-in. Finally, we consider 
the issue whether shared beliefs may be formed and spread inversely being exported 
by institutions or reconstructed by means of discourse, but not slowly developed 
from accepted ideas looking for similarities.  
 
Logical modelling helps us to illustrate the connection between beliefs and 
institutions and the role of ideology as a “bridge between high-level principles and 
decision-making practice” (Goodpaster, 1985), fixing the practices caused by shared 
beliefs, filling the institutions with sense. The second, inverse, meaning of ideology 
is demonstrated with the example of Sustainable development/CSR belief 
dissemination.      
 
Types of Ideology: 
 
There can be defined several levels of ideology. According to the Schmid’s 
understanding (1981) and terminology, they are the following: 
1. Primary ideology which is expressed in actions of an individual to 
fulfill his/her purposes. This ideology stems from practice, from the private 
experience, decisions led to positive results fixed in memory.  Schmid calls it the 
“logic of a practice” (1981) highlighting its purposiveness and rationality.  
2. Spontaneous ideology is based not merely on logic, but also on 
values, moral principles, ideas what is good and what is bad, what has to be changed. 
Schmid finds this type of ideology to be the “raw material” for the further levels of 
ideology (this type of ideology correlates with Durkheim’s myths). 
3. Secondary ideology is the “result of collective accommodation of 
experiences” (Schmid 1981). This kind of ideology is expressed in traditions, 
customs, commonly recognized practices (that are defined as informal institutions by 
North, or rites by Durkheim).  
4. Third order ideologies exist in the form of doctrine, justified truth 
promising better life to society in general. It may be fixed in formal rules and 
practices to be followed, often under compulsion for the sake of societal welfare. 
According to Durkheim (1938) this ideology is reflected in interrelated practices and 
materialized in the monuments, architecture, etc. 
 
Thus, ideology seems to be the inevitable quality of a human being (Platonova, 
2010). In the framework of this paper we understand ideology as a kind of belief 
fitted with reasoning and values which are sharable.  Belief is indeed the reaction to 
uncertainty, to the questions which often cannot be plainly answered. To interpret 
the environment, to make decisions in accordance with this interpretation, to act not 
spontaneously and chaotically, rather consistently, to get motivation and move 
forward one has to develop and accept the set of ideas about environment as 
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representing reality. Questioning, believing as a reaction to an unanswered question 
and recurring practices caused by beliefs form these very mental models (North, 
1993), myths (Durkheim, 1938), clusters of beliefs (van Dijk, 1998). When  the  
clusters  of  beliefs or internal representations are shared among members of a group, 
they obtain the  social  dimension  (van  Dijk,  1998)  and  with this set of attributes 
they can be called ideology in the customary sense of the word. 
 
Table 1. Types of Ideology 
Types Names by other 
authors 
Dimension  Description  Examples  
Prior 
ideology  
 “Subject” effect 
(Althusser, 1969): 
replication of 
Ideology/ Practice/ 
Subject 
 
Product of a 
complex, real 
situation (Schmid, 
1981) 
 
 
 
Micro 
(individual) 
“Mode of conception” 
(when we 
spontaneously 
understand the 
situation in a particular 
way, so we use 
“character mask” (K. 
Marx) 
 
“A theoretical 
construct, logic of a 
practice” (Schmid, 
1981). This logic is 
relative to the 
purposiveness of the 
of human life – driven 
by “the objective 
necessity implied by 
the preconditions of 
the practice” 
Practice of 
capitalist 
who must 
accumulate 
profit (K. 
Marx). 
Spontaneous 
ideology 
(first order) 
Social 
representations 
(Van Dijk, 1998) 
 
Mental model 
(North, 1993, 
Denzau and North, 
1994) 
 
 
Micro 
(individual) 
Practicing creates 
spontaneous 
ideologies, which 
contain pre-established 
ideological notions, 
which can be the result 
of clever ideological 
manipulation, so they 
might be falsely 
pretending to be truly 
original (Schmid, 
1981) 
By 
practicing 
the capitalist 
relations of 
production 
the 
bourgeois 
logic is 
transformed 
by the 
workers into 
a 
“spontaneou
s” workers’ 
ideology 
(Schmid, 
1981) 
Secondary Informal Meso “Result of collective Feminism, 
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ideology 
(second 
order) 
institutions (North, 
1991) 
 
“set of interrelated 
practices” 
(Durkheim, 1938) 
(social 
groups) 
accommodation of 
experiences” (Schmid, 
1981). Expressed in 
traditions, customs, 
and commonly 
recognized practices. 
ideology of 
entrepreneur
s, 
professional
s’ ideology. 
Third order 
ideology 
(political) 
Informal + formal 
institutions (North, 
1991) 
Macro 
(societies)  
“Partisan restructuring 
of the ideological raw 
material” (Schmid, 
1981) 
Communism
, liberalism, 
fascism 
(Dugin, 
2012)  
 
Fixation of belief: 
 
The process of ideology institutionalization seems to be a matter of course, inasmuch 
as  individuals tend to keep their beliefs protected from doubts as belief is a “calm 
and satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid or to change to a belief in 
anything else” (Peirce, 1877). Peirce calls it “fixation of belief” and define methods 
how to make believing state stable. Method of tenacity presupposes striving for 
desired calmness of mind that is often reflected in accepting an idea without 
consideration and keeping distrust to opposed opinions. A priory method is based on 
instinct and logical conscience, but often leads to not correct, but rather comfortable 
conclusions. Method of scientific investigation is the most reliable as presenting 
“any distinction of a right and a wrong way”, according to Peirce (1877).  
 
The mentioned methods can be applied on the micro level only, since they help to 
fix merely what is called primary or spontaneous ideology. This Pierce’s 
classification of belief fixation methods leads us to the idea of ideology in its 
negative connotation as “false consciousness” (Marx and Engels, 1955). Pierce 
points out that individuals often incline to apply the method of tenacity or a priory 
method to fix their representation of reality, because firstly the scientific method 
claims time and undesirable efforts to be practiced, and secondly, individuals agree 
to be comforted in self-deception and prevent themselves from changes. 
 
On the meso- and macro-levels, by the way, fixation of belief is also in use. Among 
the methods defined by Peirce there is one more, the method of authority, which 
appears to be the most appropriate for making shared beliefs (secondary ideologies) 
fixed. This method is applied by those who have power to create institutions 
attracting attention to the ideas to be accepted and believed in. “Let the will of the 
state act, then, instead of that of the individual. Let an institution be created which 
shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, 
to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same 
time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or 
expressed” (Peirce, 1877). Considering the individuals’ weakness in their reality 
interpretation followed by decision-making, Pierce advocates the method of 
authority dispensing them from obligation to investigate and examine reality.    
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Institutions in the case of the method of authority are the instruments of beliefs 
fixation. According to the institutional theory, institutions as set of rules based on 
beliefs are created by people to maximize their wealth (North, 1990). Institutions 
presuppose not merely laws and contracts, customs and moral codes, but also 
mechanism of compulsion, which assures following the rules, makes them 
advantageous to be carried out.  
 
Thus, institutions are closely connected to constraints to act in accordance with the 
existing ideology, which is beliefs shared by the members of society or at least by 
authorities creating the institutions and preventing the undesirable actions with 
sanctions and constrains. Assuming that individuals tend to keep the calmness of 
mind, it becomes clear why constraints resulting from the institutions are often 
accepted. “Refusal from flexibility of decision making leads to Institutions. When 
there is a gap between an agent's competence and the difficulty of the decision 
problem to be solved (a C-D gap), the human agent constructs rules to restrict the 
flexibility of her own choices in such situations - i.e., institutions”. 
 
From such a radical point of view, institutions channel the range of choices, they 
teach how to perceive the world, how to act – so they limit the human internal 
freedom and individuals accept it voluntarily as being directed to utility and 
pleasantness, calmness of mind. This way we approach the old philosophical 
question brightly illustrated by the Russian writer F. Dostoevsky in his famous The 
Grand Inquisitor parable (novel The Brothers Karamazov): does reality have to be 
constructed and regulated for the sake of people comfort and happiness or it should 
be left chaotic to inspire individuals’ search for truth? Boukaert and Ghesquiere 
(2004) analyze “an ethic of hypocrisy” or “ethical temptation” as a choice between a 
rational and a spiritual approach to ethics, understanding by rational ethics “a 
process of moral deliberation conducted by instrumental reason in order to maximize 
social happiness”.   
 
In the framework of the paper we put the same question differently: are institutions 
to be developed evolutionally from beliefs once shared and disseminated to be later 
on reconsidered and changed when the method of scientific investigation makes 
some new quality of environment revealed? Or is it reasonable for the individuals’ 
sake to artificially institutionalize environment and keep it possibly unchanged and 
managed by specialists to maximize individuals’ wealth? The latter is expressed by 
any political ideology, that is the merge of both knowledge and ideology with each 
other presented as a doctrine, set of rules which are already not merely informal, but 
rather formal institutions (North, 1991). 
 
Ideology: The mechanism of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization 
 
Belief evolving from idea to institution: 
Institutions may be developed as a result of ideological change accepted in 
collective–choice and reflected in political actions. This way of change is called 
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evolutional. Revolutionary, radical way of institutional change seems to happen as 
well.  In this part of the article we consider the evolutional way of institutional 
development: slow change from beliefs to rules.  
 
There may be defined necessary and sufficient conditions for ideology to be 
embodied in institutions. Necessary condition is conformity of mental models of 
actors taking part in ideology dissemination. Mental models conformity is about 
resemblance of spontaneous ideologies of individuals (Schmid, 1981). This 
resemblance is easier to be found among the members of one society influenced my 
common traditions, customs, cultural principles. The more mental models of 
individuals resemble, the higher the chance that individuals would share the same 
ideas and act in the same way.  
 
Sufficient condition of ideology institutiolization is accumulation of resources. 
Conformity of mental models is not enough to construct or reconstruct environment 
in a new way. Resources as they are listed in economics: land, labor, capital goods, - 
are needed to support the spread of ideas. Time and energy to be spent as attributes 
of conformity of mental models indicate the believers’ readiness to contribute to the 
ideology dissemination. Resources accumulation in its turn is the factor influencing 
how quickly and successfully the ideology dissemination may happen.  
 
If ideological theory, scientifically developed or evolutionally brought to a state of 
traditions, provides the followers with informal rules, an ideological program plans 
how to create the formal ones and which way they are to fix the followers’ behavior. 
Institutions are “humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and 
social interactions” (North, 1991). Developing one after another, according to North, 
informal (customs, traditions) and formal (laws, constitutions) institutions serve 
individuals’ striving for wealth-maximization. Institutions “evolve incrementally, 
connecting the past with the present and the future” (North, 1991).  
 
Institutions are “devised to create order” (North, 1991). Ideology in this sense fixes 
institutions as institutions make individuals act in accordance with ideology. Thus, 
in this interaction ideology and institutions are the parts of one system (hereafter II-
system) which can be illustrated as a treasure chest. A chest is to keep treasure, when 
empty it loses its meaning as a treasure keeper. And treasure without chest is easily 
removed part by part and loses its value as well, since parts are commonly valued 
less than unbroken, one piece gem.  
 
The scheme 1 demonstrates how accepted ideas turned into individual ideologies 
(preliminary or spontaneous ideology by Schmid) by means of discourse practices 
are crystallized to the secondary ideology reflected in customs, traditions, and 
behavioral patterns. The process of institutionalization continues in attempt, firstly, 
to preserve initial ideas from changes, secondly, to make environment more certain 
and predictable.  
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Scheme 1. Mechanism of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization (II-system) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
II-system (from Ideology to Institution) is an ideal one, illustrating static situation 
characterized with Ideology and Institution conformity. The latter means that 
institutions serve principles proclaimed by ideology and make actors who accept the 
ideology benefit from following the rules. Ideology in its turn fills institution with 
sense, makes individuals follow the rules not because of fear of compulsions, but 
because of believing in institutions effectiveness. Such combination is self-enforcing 
for both ideology and institution that is proved further in the paper with game-theory 
method.  
 
II-system considers Ideology-Institution combination under static conditions. But 
environment is changing, and so are the beliefs. Environmental change might cause 
appearance of new knowledge, purposes, and values. When following this change 
institutions might be expected to be transformed as well.  If formal rules still keep 
ideas, which might already be transformed from their initial state “I” to “I1” that 
may lead to lack of Ideology-Institution conformity and II-system crisis (Denzau and 
North, 1994). Further we consider how ideas and beliefs may be transformed on the 
way of ideology institutionalization. 
 
II-system transformation: institutional change: 
 
I 
Idea 
I I 
Discourse 
I I I 
Resources 
accumulation 
I I I 
First order ideology 
formation 
Second order ideology 
(shared beliefs) formation 
by means of discourse 
Third order ideology 
formation by means of 
resources accumulation 
(institutionalization) 
In
stitu
tio
n
alizatio
n
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There have been developed different theories on institutional change. Some of them 
explain creation of institutions by political process, some theories put evolutionary 
development as the basis of institutions emergence. Some theories stress on slow 
institutional change searching for equilibrium state, other ones define sharp reaction 
to dissonance as the main driving force of behavior alteration. In the article we 
consider change of institutions continuing the idea of beliefs evolving from ideas to 
behavioral patterns and fixed rules. In this paragraph we begin with the question of 
what causes the change of ideologies. Then we propose scenarios of how II-system 
would change in case of ideological transformation. 
 
In general words, obsolescence of existing belief-systems, ideologies stimulates their 
change. This causes institutional transformation to happen. Such obsolescence is 
reflected in cognitive dissonance and search for cognitive consonance and ideology 
reconsideration. Cognitive dissonance is the result of the following events (Faccini, 
Melki, 2011): 
 
1. Evolution of knowledge; 
2. Facing a problem to be solved; 
3. Incoherence of proposed justifications; 
4. Mental experience.  
 
These events lead to the radical change of belief-system only in a radical situation, 
which are, according to Williamson (2000), great events (such as wars, occupation, 
perceived threats, military coups) or window opportunities (ideological lack descried 
by Wilson and Kelling). 
 
North assumes that individual experiences lead to the change of mental models if the 
results of the experience cannot be explained and approved with contemporary 
ideological principles. This change can cause ideological crisis and then a secondary 
ideology transformation, if it meets the conformity of mental models and ability to 
accumulate resources. Taking into consideration the cognitive process, it is worth 
noticing that Denzau and North distinguish two levels of learning (1994). The first 
type leads to appearance of new mental models as a result of individual experience 
and structuring the categories of environment in a new way. The second type of 
learning is not so radical. It influences available mental models change and does not 
provoke new ones to occur. 
 
The similar learning scheme is presented by Piaget (1999). From his perspective 
there are two ways for individuals to interpret environment: assimilation and 
accommodation. Assimilation is coping by means of available mental models that 
presuppose the selection of information in accordance with the existing belief-
system. Accommodation is about mental models modification or creation of the new 
ones to cope with the results of the cognitive process. Accommodation, on the 
contrast to the assimilation process, leads to the “break in an individual history of 
mental models” (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner 2009).      
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Scheme 2. Ideological transformation leading to Institutional change (Inversion and 
mediation scenarios) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New mental models are supposed to lead to the change of dominating ideology. 
Russian sociologist and philosopher Ahiezer A.S. defines two possible institutional 
reactions to ideological change, namely inversion and mediation (1997). Both 
scenarios are pictured below (Scheme 2). Inversion presupposes that either 
ideological change is ignored, disregarded by existing institutions or institutions 
accept ideological transformation, but do not change accordingly.  
 
Consequently, inversion is considered by Ahiezer as rather negative process leading 
to instability.  Abandoning the transformation institutions can cause either new 
ideology formation and subsequent ideological confrontation or the situation when 
an old institution operates without meeting new ideas. Mediation, on the contrary, 
presupposes institutional change in accordance with ideological transformation and 
meeting expectations of those who follow the principles of ideology. 
 
In addition to inversion and mediation as the scenarios of evolutional change of 
institutions, there is one more, which radically differs from the ones proposed by 
Ahiezer. The difference is that this scenario does not presuppose any change of 
either ideology or institutions.  
 
 
 
 
 
I I I 
Institutionalization  
Timeline 
I1 I1 I1 
I1 I1 I1 
Mediation 
(scenario 2) 
Inversion 
(scenario 1) 
Institutional change 
Change 
I I I 
I. Platonova, M. Tcvetkov, O. Chkalova, M. Efremova 
 
75 
 
 
Path-dependence  
Scheme 3. Institutional rigidity (lock-in scenario) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
North, in spite of highlighting in his previous works the role of individual 
experience, in the later papers points out that institutions are rather unhurried in their 
change, even when not benefiting the society (1990). North explains this institutional 
rigidity by the assumption that individuals learn from the outcomes of their previous 
choices and then keep the results of the past learning experience unchanged.  
 
The resistance to cognitive change, change of mental models underlies the rigidity of 
institutional change. This way North connects the institutional rigidity interpretation 
with path-dependence theory. The theory illustrates that, when facing a problem 
situation individuals tend to deconstruct the problem or act in accordance with the 
previously obtained mental model. As a result, locks-in appear, which are getting 
stuck with the traditional styles of thinking and acting (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner, 
2007) (Scheme 3). 
 
Individual presuppositions and social domain resources (such as knowledge) put 
learners on the path, which they do not necessarily recognize. What can provide with 
such recognition of stay on the path is the external shock: 
 
1. The enforcement of a formerly unenforced institutions; 
2. Unexpected implementation of an institution which renders the individual       
            unable to act according to its established mental model. 
 
If not external shocks, then artificial institutional transformation can be applied to 
manage and change individual mental models. “In this way, policy can stabilize or 
destabilize the belief in certain institutions or ideologies” (Haase, Roedenberg, 
Soellner, 2009). Thus, beliefs, mental models when find conformity become shared 
by members of a community. It is the necessary condition of the second order 
I I I 
Institutionalization  
I I I 
Timeline 
I I I 
I I I 
In
ertn
ess  
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ideology formation and dissemination. To be successfully spread, the ideology needs 
to be supported with resources, such as working power and physical capital. In such 
a way first informal, then formal rules occur to create and fix the order how 
ideological principles are to be expressed in actions. These rules are institutions.  
Thus, there must be interconnection between ideologies and institutions to call it II-
system. The system progresses and improves when the change of its elements is 
synchronized. And conversely, II-system becomes unstable when its elements 
change in different directions, with different rapidity or do not change at all losing 
conformity with environment. 
 
Having considered the direct way of beliefs dissemination and institutionalization, 
we define three scenarios of institutional change resulting from the transformation of 
ideology: mediation, inversion and lock-in. Mediation is rather idealistic scenario 
suggesting the steady ideological transformation followed by consequent 
institutional change. Inversion explains contradiction stemming from institutional 
inertness, rigidity that causes their unconformity to a constantly evolving ideology.  
 
The third scenario reveals contradictions as well, but ones of different nature – 
caused by rigidity of both ideology and institutions. This scenario can be called 
“lock-in” as the one explaining ideological and institutional rigidity with path-
dependence theory, which reveals that decision-making is limited with the set of 
mental models formerly formed and kept unchanged in spite of transformations of 
environment. Path-dependence is the result of the second learning level (Denzau and 
North, 1994), application or interpretation of environment by means of assimilation 
Piaget (1999).  
 
This way of interpretation is predominantly applied by individuals as a result of their 
strive for cost limitation, since it is much easier to reuse the previously obtained 
experience or commonly accepted practices resulting from the experience of others, 
than to start structuring categories of event space leading to uncertain outcomes. In 
such a way self-reinforcement mechanism as the basis of path-dependency is 
initiated.  
 
The latter forms individuals “preprogrammed” by their experience and personal 
history (Peirce, 1981). Personal motivation (Denzau and North, 1994), great events 
(Williamson, 2000) or external shocks (Haase, Roedenberg, Soellner, 2009) may 
help to step aside from the path. Another way to initiate reflection, first level 
learning or accommodation appears to be policy making and management of 
institutions.  
 
Such a summing up of the conclusions made so far in the paper moves to the main 
question whether there is the inverse way of beliefs dissemination. Inverse as used 
here means not evolutional way, rather a radical one through artificial management 
of institutions in order to influence desirable ideological change and behavior of 
individuals. 
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Ideology: The mechanism of Institutions Ideologization 
 
Game theory in the II-system understanding: 
Before we move to the inverse mechanism of belief dissemination, we consider II-
system (Ideology-Institutions interdependence) explained with the game theory 
method. Game in this theory is a model of a conflict situation. A conflict situation 
takes place when objectives of players of a game are either opposite to each other 
(antagonistic games), partly opposite (nonantagonistic games) or coincide 
(cooperative games).  
 
The reason why game theory is applied for the II-system analysis is the following. 
When modelling a conflict situation, the set of possible actions of the game’s players 
has to be defined. Actions can be chosen consciously, so be reasoned (in this case 
they are called the private actions) or made randomly. Actions are accumulated to 
strategies of the players. The way the strategies are accomplished defines the result 
of the game (payoff).  
 
The antagonistic games are characterized with the zero payoffs of the players, 
whereas the nonantagonistic games lead to the result different from the zero state. 
Solution concept or equilibrium of a game is reached when the players find such a 
set of strategies, which allows maximization of their wins even if they know in 
advance how the opponent would act. After the equilibrium state of a game is found; 
set of strategies to be used and frequency of this usage is defined by the players.   
 
The equilibrium of a game actually is that very institution as being a set of actions 
and compulsion mechanism to make the rules work steadily (North, 1990). Loss of 
opportunity to maximize payoff can be considered also as a compulsion, since it 
makes a player follow the rules.  The principles of the search for a game equilibrium 
are based on the players’ payoff analysis. At the same time the game theory 
considers shared beliefs, which are “central to self-enforcing institutions” (Greif and 
Laitin, 2004). 
 
Coming closer to the issue of ideology considered through the game theory method, 
we point out that ideology defines the scale, dimension of how players estimate their 
wins. Such an idea can be found in Bowels (2003), Silberberg (1987), Greif and 
Laitin (2004) who conclude that ideology influences decision making as well as 
search for wealth. Moreover, the weight of ideology in players’ utility estimation is 
in inverse proportion to the price the players pay for the opportunity to express their 
values and interests. Consequently, ideology formation and dissemination among 
members of a social group can be seen as a way to influence and change a player’s 
utility estimation. Change of ideology causes the change of utility resulting from the 
same actions players used to commit before the ideology becomes transformed.  In 
such a way the game equilibrium changes as well, meaning that actions change 
accordingly. Such a statement proves the idea of the direct way of beliefs (which are 
utility estimation in the terms of game theory) dissemination and institutionalization. 
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The example of ideology’s influence on players’ decision-making and further 
actions can be illustrated through the consideration of the situations showing the 
emergence of institutions. The three key problems lead to the emergence of 
institutions: equilibrium inefficiency (the prisoners’ dilemma), coordination of 
actions, inequality. In the equilibrium inefficiency situation players choose the 
decisions and actions effective for them both, not for the whole society. The game 
called “Two machine-gunners” is an illustrative example demonstrating the role of 
ideology in decision-making. 
 
Two machine-gunners have to defeat the attack. Each of them has two strategies 
either fight or desert. If both of the machine-gunners fight, the attack will be 
defeated. If at least one of the players deserts, the one who fights will perish. If there 
is no ideology, shared beliefs in patriotism, native country’s interests superiority, 
then uncertainty of players concerning the possible opponent’s actions forms the 
following game matrix (Table 2): 
 
Table 2. The game matrix of machine-gunners with no common ideology  
 Strategies 
To fight To desert 
Strategies  
To fight  1;1 -2;2 
To desert 2;-2 -1;-1 
 
In accordance with the principle of finding the dominant strategy, each player of the 
game will choose “to desert”. In such a case, the equilibrium state of the game 
differs from what society needs. If the players choose the strategies “to fight”, the 
integrated payoff for society equals 2 (1 + 1), while the other strategies combination 
leads to the results from -2 to 0 (Table 2).  
 
There are two possible modes to reach the equilibrium state of the game and move it 
to the position desirable for society. First mode is external compulsion to force the 
machine-gunners fight, such as mine laying on the passages, severe disciplining, etc. 
However, external compulsion is characterized by the higher risk of opportunistic 
behavior, when the compulsion mechanism outcome becomes less controlled.  
 
Therefore, another method defined to compel players to follow the rules leading to 
the society’s payoff maximization is triggering the internal mechanism of self-
compulsion. Thereafter each of the players changes the utility estimation resulting 
from their unchanged strategies. Ideology of patriotism, shared beliefs in honor, self-
devotion and self-sacrifice influence the game results in the following way (Table 3). 
Thus, changed payoffs cause the changed dominant strategies which are “to fight” in 
the case of ideological influence. 
 
Summing up the game theory method applied to the II-system analysis we prove that 
ideology, providing individuals with particular utility estimation, influences 
decision-making and actions consequently. In course of time if the utility estimation 
B A 
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is stable, and repeatable actions become regular as well, this way they turn into 
institutions.  
Compulsions to keep these institutions working can be external (a physical 
punishment or social disapproval leading to stigmatization) or internal (individual 
beliefs and values provided with ideology). Merely external compulsion mechanism 
does not ensure following the rules as effective as the combination of external and 
internal factors influencing behavior. Thus, ideology serves as an internal motivator 
diminishing the risk of opportunistic behavior.  
 
Table 3. The game matrix of machine-gunners influenced by ideology  
 Strategies 
To fight To desert 
Strategies 
To fight 1;1 -1;-2 
To desert -2;-1 -2;-2 
 
On the other hand, institutions framing environment influence the change of beliefs 
along with “wealth, identity, ability, knowledge, residential distribution, 
occupational specialization” (Greif and Laitin, 2004) and even “beyond the behavior 
in the transaction it (institution) governs”. Further in the paper such a mechanism of 
ideological change caused by institutional transplantation is considered.        
 
Institutional transplantation and inverse way of beliefs dissemination: 
In the previous part of the article, the evolutional way of institutional change was 
considered. The described way of shared beliefs (which are secondary ideologies) 
dissemination and institutionalization we call evolutional as well, since the process 
itself is staged, gradual and rather slow. Revolutionary change of ideology is hardly 
possible, inasmuch as the state of metal models conformity and resources 
accumulation takes time to occur. Remembering scientific revolutions, the Kuhnian 
paradigm shift, it has to be noticed that the process is still evolutional showing how 
“set of ideas which is clearly distinguishable from the previous one will gain 
dominance and find expression in a new set of institutions, thus creating a new 
period of path-dependent and gradual change” (Dabrowska and Zweynert, 2014).  
 
However, revolutionary change of institutions is a case of evidence. This kind of 
revolution can be arranged by means of rapid institutional transplantation and 
expressed in “critical junctures” (Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007).    
According to the theory of institutional transplantation, revolutionary change of 
institutions is conditioned by two factors: political will to transfer institutions and 
the institutional projection in correlation with the informal and formal rules existing 
in a different society institutions are planned to be transferred to. Institutional 
projection means estimation of the successful institutional transfer probability. The 
probability estimation is mainly juridical, since it supposes evaluation of different 
social groups’ formal institutions conformity. It is based on the comparison of the 
donor’s and the recipient’s legal systems and estimation of their equivalence 
(Reception/Dictionnaire encyclopedique de theorie et de sociologie du droit 1993). 
A B 
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Informal institutions of the recipient social group are to be taken into account when 
making an institutional projection.  
 
Listing the subjects of institutional transplantation, Mamadouch, Jong and Lalenis 
(2002) define the following “transplanters”: state legislators, supranational agencies, 
subnational governments, administrative bodies, business firms, non-governmental 
organizations, political parties and media-companies. The main motives of 
“transplanters” are bringing improvement and development acceleration or breaking 
local resistance. The latter statement is “food for thought” in the context of our paper 
with its purpose to answer the question if institutional change may cause the change 
of ideology. In the framework of the paper, we are particularly interested in the 
theory suggesting that the change of behavior can lead to the change mental models, 
which means that ideology transformation can be the result of institutional change. 
 
In spite of being rarely considered, the belief dissemination seems to be able to 
happen inversely as a result of institutional transplantation. Institutions as the sets of 
rules contain ideas justifying why these rules are to be followed. When exported 
(transferred, transplanted) institutions initially turn into empty chests as in a new 
environment they might not express any idea. In such a case, they appear to be 
pointless until there is a community of followers believing that the institutions serve 
a purpose of wealth. 
 
Filling institutions with ideas intrinsic to them originally, what we call 
ideologization, can be organized by means of discourse practices through teaching, 
mass media propaganda, indoctrination, etc. From this stage, the next steps of beliefs 
dissemination are the same as previously considered: through teaching, propaganda, 
indoctrination the ideas are spread to be accepted or rejected, then shared and 
eventually institutionalized. It is certainly the simplified scheme showing the general 
path of ideas, beliefs, and rules. It is not for any particular reason we use a word 
“path” and not, for example, “trajectory”, despite both are synonyms. The issue is 
that institutional transplantation may cause path-dependence in a new environment. 
In the scheme 4 this export of path is pictured as a Scenario 1. 
 
Scheme 4. Three Scenarios of beliefs disseminations through the Export of 
Institutions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I I I 
Institutionalization  
I I I 
Timeline 
I(1,2) I(1,2
) 
I(1,2
) 
Export 
Ideologization Institutional
ization  
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Scenario 2 (scheme 4) of the inverse beliefs dissemination can be described as 
institutional transplantation resulting stemming from a new ideology. It happens 
when exported institution becomes filled with ideas different from original ones. The 
reason of such a transformation of ideas is quite complex. Cultural identity, 
psychological peculiarity, cognitive abilities of individuals living in the environment 
the institutions are exported to, pedagogical and oratorical skills of those who teach, 
inspire, convince, political will concerning the new rules – not the complete list of 
possible reasons explaining why original ideas change and turn from I to I1.  
 
As the ideas, which are spread through discourse become assimilated with the ones 
relevant to the mental models of individuals of recipient-environment, it leads to the 
ideology transformation, conditioning institutional change. Obviously, the changed 
institutions do not resemble the donor ones even when they are still named alike the 
institutions they are originated from. The modern Russian history shows many 
example of institutional transplantation. Institutions evolutionally developed in the 
Western countries, when exported to the Russian environment, caused ideological 
injection and further assimilation of the liberal ideas to the local ones.  
 
As a result, presumably, liberal ideology institutions are named in the western 
manner, but they have been functioning differently. The examples of such a scenario 
can be found in research papers. For instance, Dabrowska and Zweynert analyze the 
case of Stabilization Fund in Russia as an example of how “domestic discourses 
increasingly move away from the neo-liberal ideas that formed the background to 
the SF” (2014). They describe this kind of institutional transplantation “the import of 
ready-made institutions without a preceding import of ideas” (Dabrowska and 
Zweynert, 2014).  The main reasons why institutional transplantation happens by the 
second scenario at most are the following (Dabrowska and Zweynert, 2014): 
 
1. There is a lack of experts among the members of the social group importing 
institutions. Thus, the original ideas of imported institutions are not understood in 
appropriate manner or understood superficially. 
2. There is a lack of discussion to spread and disseminate ideas and obtain 
broader support.   
I I I I I I 
I I I I1 I1 I1 
Export 
Export 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 2 
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3. The “separation of ideas from their current institutional mooring” (Blyth, 
2002) does not take place in the social group importing institutions. 
 
The third reason of institutional transplantation by the second scenario turned out to 
be the pivotal one. Moreover, it still seems to be unclear how this “separation of 
ideas” can be managed. According to Dabrowska and Zweynert (2014) academic 
and political discourse are conductive to “detaching ideas from previous mental 
models” and their further adaptation to the recipient environment.  
 
Summing up we would add, that the evolution of an ideology from ideas through 
personal beliefs to shared ones reflected in respective practices is a case of rather 
local and closed community, more or less independent from the rules and practices 
of another one. Globalization having started its strong, solid expansion in the 20
th
 
century predetermined the institutional transplantation across the globe. The only 
way to let globalization continue is providing more and more communities with the 
common rules and practices, since waiting for belief systems development and 
integration to the single one gives no evident forecast whether beliefs are going to be 
influenced with the same ideas and be transformed in the same way and form to the 
same ideologies. That explains why the inverse way of ideology formation is in use 
in the age of globalization.  
 
The set of institutions exported from one community to another moves globalization 
further, “but no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject” 
(Peirce, 1877). The risk of opportunistic behavior and high costs of compulsion 
mechanism maintenance still makes an ideology significant for the rapid and low-
cost institutionalization. That is why ideologization of transplanted institutions plays 
increasingly significant role in managing institutional change. The example of 
Sustainable development/CSR concept spreading around the world since 70s is quite 
demonstrative. 
 
The concept of Sustainable development as an example of ideology formed in the 
inverse way: 
The Concept of Sustainable development seems to have been shaping into the new 
ideology (Platonova 2013) based on the beliefs in economic prosperity, 
environmental quality and social balance (known also as triple bottom line), which 
Goodpaster defines as a shift from individualism or the “Lockean” ideology to 
“communitarian” ideology characterized with such values as communitarianism, 
rights and duties of membership, community needs, active planning state, holism-
interdependence (1985).  
 
 “Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. It 
contains within it two key concepts: the concept of needs, in particular the essential 
needs of the world's poor, to which overriding priority should be given; and the idea 
of limitations imposed by the state of technology and social organization on the 
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environment's ability to meet present and future needs”, what is defined in the 
Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987.  
 
The concept has been rapidly developing since 60s and is already practically 
implemented in CSR (corporate social responsibility). There is a big variety of how 
CSR is defined (Carroll, 1999). In general understanding CSR means voluntarily 
accepted (by a corporation) obligations to fulfill not merely shareholders’ 
expectations, but rather objectives and needs of society members.  
 
Sustainable development is a broader notion assuming obligations of citizens, 
politicians, NGOs, etc. along with corporations and their employees to behave in a 
sustainable and responsible way. Sustainable development/CSR concept appears to 
be ideological by nature, since it deals with ethical principles, moral justification and 
has normative character (Goodpaster, 1985). In the framework of the paper, we are 
interested in how such an ideology as Sustainable development/CSR is 
disseminated: directly from ideas to institutions or inversely from institutions to 
ideas. 
 
The idea of business responsibility to society is obviously not new. Protestant ethics 
influencing entrepreneurship in Germany, Old Belief as a basis of merchants’ 
business communities taking responsibility for social needs in Russia are just a 
couple of examples of shared beliefs stemming from religion. Those shared beliefs 
were spread, fixed in informal rules and behavioral patterns, so they constituted 
ideologies influencing business practices of that time.  
 
What we have now is something different, and not because the new beliefs in social 
responsibility stem not from religion, but because these beliefs are formed and 
disseminated in a different way. Firstly, the declared scale of social responsibility 
beliefs dissemination is much broader then in the past; it is a global scale that is 
declared. Secondly, the mechanism applied to make beliefs dissemination quick 
appears to be this very inverse way we described, dissemination through 
institutionalization and subsequent ideologization.    
 
Systemic thinking allows us to understand why Sustainable development/CSR belief 
cannot shape and spread in the direct way. For that, we imagine the economic 
environment as a system claiming to become global. The global system differs from 
the set of local ones with the absence of borders, barriers separating local systems 
from each other. The system cannot become global until all of the local ones follow 
the same rules and principles, stop competing with each other. Global problems such 
as economical (lack of resources, potential for further growth, etc.), ecological 
(global warming, exhaustion of the soil, etc.), social (overpopulation, child labor, 
poverty, etc.) cannot be solved locally. If only one local system changes the rules to 
be followed, it takes the risk of losing its competitiveness on the global scale as a 
minority with lack of resources and power.  
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According to Lim and Tsutsu (2012), strict regulation of corporations in one country 
would only benefit other countries where regulation is not so strict and burden 
placed on companies is not so heavy. The authors exemplify why CSR regulation 
and dissemination has to be global to help in solving global problems. The authors 
point out that institutional environment has to be managed to shape government and 
corporate actions to make them be driven by social responsibility principles (Lim 
and Tsutsui, 2012; Tcvetkov et al., 2015). They direct to the history of Sustainable 
development/CSR institutionalization.   
 
If we take a look at the Sustainable Development Timeline issued by The 
International Institute of Sustainable Development, we may notice that the concept 
of Sustainable development is being actively institutionalized in Guidelines, 
Standards, etc. even before it is disseminated as ideology in the global scale. In 
1990s, the global CSR frameworks have been established, among which two are 
considered the most prominent ones: the UN Global Compact and Global Reporting 
Initiative (Lim and Tsutsui, 2012). Both initiatives rely on self-reporting by 
corporations concerning their compliance with CSR framework requirements.  
 
If we look at the statistics, we notice that the number of participants reporting in 
accordance with both initiatives has been growing. From the UN Global Compact 
Local Network 2013 report we find that since its official launch on July 26, 2000, 
the initiative has grown to more than 12,000 participants, including over 8,000 
businesses from more than 140 countries. The increase in 2013 is 12,7% in 
comparison with the participants number of the former year. GRI guidelines are 
widely used by corporations, public agencies, SMEs, NGOs as well. About 7,000 
organizations from different countries have a GRI profile.    
 
Thus, Sustainable development/CSR initiatives that are actually formal institutions 
fixed in guidelines and standards are transplanted, exported globally. With time, 
these institutions seem to become self-enforcing, since attracting more adherents 
they leave the rest on the same market uncompetitive. Nevertheless, the fact that 
companies follow CSR ideas and principles does not mean that these ideas are 
accepted as valuable ones.  
 
When transplanted for the development reasons institutions still keep original ideas, 
which are in a different environment unfamiliar for the majority of individuals, so in 
theory have no or only few followers. “Green washing”, “blue washing” are the 
terms appeared in relation to opportunistic behavior of those who declare CSR ideas, 
but do not believe in them. Cross-national time-series analyses carried out by Lim 
and Tsutsu (2012) show that institutional pressure is effective somehow, but leads to 
“ceremonial commitment in developed countries”, where corporations make 
“discursive commitments without subsequent action”. That is the example of 
opportunistic behavior driven by the intention to win from compliance with CSR 
principles without spending too much effort to insert these principles to a corporate 
strategy.  
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Such an opportunistic behavior may be reflected in using CSR as a merely image 
making instrument (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010) through PR-campaigns, 
outreach concerning GRI compliance, UN partnership, meeting sustainability 
principles without their practical application. To prevent opportunistic behavior two 
different methods can be applied, that we considered before with game theory.  First 
method is external compulsion to force companies comply with CSR principles. This 
method, as we mentioned, does not completely prevent opportunistic behavior, 
moreover it can be rather costly to control compulsion mechanism effectiveness; and 
further still in contemporary democracies violence and force of any kind are 
condemned as expression of antihumanism what is ideologically against CSR values. 
Another method of opportunism prevention is internal compulsion mechanism 
development, which is ideologization of CSR practices. 
 
To trigger the mechanism of internal compulsion, ideologization appears to be 
accomplished through discourse practices. The main instruments for ideological 
discourse turned out to be mass media and education, which is confirmed with UN 
Global Compact Local Network 2013 report, where one may find the dominant types 
of activities related to CSR. These activities are leaning and outreach. Ideologization 
to be an effective instrument of rapid CSR institutions transplantation has to be 
directed not merely to companies’ leaders and executives, but also to consumers, 
since they create a demand and sustainable consumption patterns.  
 
Ideologization is especially important to be applied towards consumers as formal 
institutions concern their economic actions to a lesser extent than they concern 
corporate practices. Without ideological matter, consumers tend to choose by price 
compared with quality, not with CSR compliance of a company-producer, “in 
general, the environmentally friendly product attribute can influence buying 
decisions only to small extent – it can play role only if price, cover and binding are 
the same” (Majlath, 2009).  
 
CSR ideologization directed to consumers, potential employees and business leaders, 
seems to be predominantly accomplished, like in case of corporations, by means of 
mass media and education. One of the examples is Sustainable Schools in the UK, 
which are a government initiative resulting from the first Education SD Action Plan. 
On their website (http://se-ed.co.uk/) we find that “the Sustainable Schools 
framework was built on the principles of care – of oneself, of others and of the 
environment”.  
 
Bachelor and Master educational programs on CSR and Sustainability, conferences 
and research projects in the CSR sphere financed by international funds, scientific 
and popular scientific journals related to CSR issues, etc. – all of the instruments of 
CSR discourse serve to ideologization of institutions created and transplanted 
globally. Obviously, CSR discourse has to be different in different societies, 
characterized with different shared mental models to conform with them and raise 
beliefs in CSR ideas, inasmuch as “we need to develop a framework that will enable 
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us to understand and model the shared mental models that guide choices and shape 
the evolution of political-economic systems and societies” (Denzau and North, 
1994). 
 
Conclusion  
 
Certainly, ideologies influenced and have been influencing economic activities, i.e. 
markets, organizations, consumers. Economy like an actor with different theatrical 
characters played various roles: kept traditions, accomplished government plans, 
inspired individuals drive and ambitions. Only to the end of the XX century 
economy turned out to become the exponent of responsibility for long-term stable 
development called sustainability. The economic actors have been chosen to fulfill 
not merely the task of growth and development, but at the same time to solve social 
and ecological problems (Our Common Future: Report of the World Commission on 
Environment and Development, United Nations, 1987). Sustainable development as 
a new ideology tends to inspire markets, organizations and consumers to behave 
ethically, responsibly, in a “green” way (Platonova, 2013).  
 
In the current situation of ongoing crises (economical, ecological, social) the process 
of ideology formation has been initiated in the inverse way by means of institutional 
transplantation to avoid slow waiting until beliefs become shared and spontaneously 
implemented in practice. The corporations, businesses have been seemingly chosen 
to start the transplantation of formal CSR institutions, since it appears to be easier 
and more democratic to make companies rather than individuals comply with the 
rules.  
 
Inasmuch as corporations are not merely formal structures, but people, formal 
institutions without belief in their concernment do not ensure Sustainable 
development/CSR principles implementation in reality. Moreover, research findings 
demonstrate that “CSR practices have a strong inverse correlation with the strength 
of institutional coordination, regulatory standards and aggregate measures of social 
and ecological performance” (Jackson and Apostolakou, 2010), that CSR may act as 
an explicit substitute in the environment characterized with weaker institutional 
pressure in liberal countries (Matten and Moon, 2008).  
 
In other words, in spite of active transplantation of CSR rules, belief in Sustainable 
development/CSR principles expressed in actions such as sustainable production, 
sustainable consumption, social engagement, etc. matters a lot. Consequently, 
ideologization of exported CSR institutions is considered to be needed.      
 
Knowledge about CSR and Sustainable development is spread by means of 
discourse practices: through mass media, education, research findings presentations, 
etc. Ideologization even seems to have become and going to be more effective in the 
Asian countries, where “communitarian” ideas of rights and duties of membership, 
community needs, holism-interdependence (Goodpaster, 1985) are traditionally, 
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unconsciously accepted, believed and shared. However, such a statement demands a 
special research on conformity of beliefs shared by the members of societies with 
Sustainable development/CSR ideas. Another possible direction of a further research 
is effectiveness of the instruments applied for ideologization of CSR institutions. 
And what is more, the risks of changing cultural identity of social groups 
experiencing institutional transplantation and ideologization by means of new ideas 
infusion seems to be the prominent research area as well.  
 
Thus, by the example of Sustainable development/CSR beliefs dissemination the 
ideology can be observed from the different perspectives. Evolutional development 
from ideas of environmentalists through belief of activists’ Sustainable development 
concept became ideology, since it met necessary condition of mental models 
conformity and sufficient condition of resources accumulation. It seems that 
Sustainable development concept is promoted by skillful administrators, since it 
spreads beyond the national borders and is exported in the form of institutions 
throughout the world. It is more likely that institutional transplantation happens by 
the inversion scenario, which means either ignoring of ideological change or 
institutional rigidity. In both cases, ideologization is necessary from the perspective 
of the game theory. Until CSR followers find strategies to maximize their payoffs 
and get the equilibrium state of the game, CSR institutions are rather unstable. 
 
 In accordance with the principle of the dominant strategy finding, each CSR actor 
would choose “to desert”. In such a case, the equilibrium state of the game differs 
from what society needs.  If we consider ideology as an internal compulsion to 
follow CSR rules, then each of the CSR actors changes the utility estimation and 
calculated payoffs consequently. Thus, changed payoffs would cause the changed 
dominant strategies which would be “to comply” in the case of ideological influence. 
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